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This exploratory research in the sociology of talk is 
focused on three questions for analysis: (1) to what extent 
does verbal information control occur in interaction, 
(2) what forms of verbal information control are used by 
people, and (3) what reasons do people give for controlling 
verbal information? 
One hundred and thirty (130) dyadic encounters were 
recorded and analyzed; the "actor" is the respondent and 
the "other" is the person with whom actor has the conversa-
tion. An analysis of these encounters revealed that nearly 
two-thirds of the 870 instances of verbal communications 
were talk which controlled information. Frequency tables 
and typologies delineate (1) forms of information control 
and (2) reasons for information control. 
Although most codes of ethics, religious canons, and 
humanitarian ideals deprecate deception in whatever form, 
conversations in everyday life are noticeably characterized 
by forms of deceit ranging from "white lies" to exploitative 
prevarication. Analysis of dyadic conversations shows that 
not only are forms of deception frequently employed, they are 
necessary, even mandatory discursive elements. In everyday 
conversations, honesty is not always the best policy. 
Introduction 
In his idealistic crusade for truth, honor, and virtue, Don Quixote with 
classic eloquence admonishes his sidekick, Sancho, that "honesty's the best 
policy" (Cervantes, 1703:666). In his farewell address in 1796, George 
Washington extolled the same cardinal virtue as applicable in both public and 
private affairs. In a spreading host of sensitivity training ideologies 
(e.g., "I'm O.K., you're 0.K.")2 and from a large number of religious pulpits 
both conservative and liberal, appeals for complete honesty in social relation-
ships are common. Supposedly many interpersonal conflicts would be cleared up, 
and our society would be a better place in which to live if complete honesty 
were practiced by everyone. 
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In addition, the American court system requires a witness to swear under 
oath to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth..." However, 
even in courtrooms, and most certainly outside of them, life is not characterized 
by such honesty. For in a precarious, symbolically constructed world, it is 
doubtful that social relationships could be established, maintained, and nurtured 
if such "whole truth and nothing but the truth" discourse characterized human 
behavior. More commonly, actors see their own interests, and very often the 
interests of others, best served by communicating more or less than the "truth." 
Social psychologists have occasionally noted this fact, Anselm Strauss, for 
example, suggests that "social relationships could hardly exist without a certain 
amount of hypocrisy and conventional masking of thought and sentiment" (Strauss, 
1969:87). And the highly influential work of Erving Goffman is a more-or-less 
continual elaboration of the point that people manage impressions by controlling 
information given others. Actors employ information shields, protect regions 
or "backstage" behavior, engage in masking or facework, cooperate in giving 
team performances to others who are not members of the team, and manipulate 
stage, props, equipment, and appearances to establish some impressions and 
mask others (Goffman, 1959: 1963; 1969). The upshot of this work is that 
people select the information they communicate to others, withholding some and 
supplying some; information control is an important and necessary process in 
everyday life.3 
Research Questions 
As a study of the sociology of talk (Lyman and Scott, 1970:112), this 
paper is focused on three questions for analysis: 
1) To what extent does verbal information control occur in 
interaction? 
2) What forms of verbal information control are used by people? 
3) What reasons do people give for controlling verbal information? 
Definitions 
4 
This research is confined to verbal dyadic encounters. The two partici-
pants in each encounter are the actor and his audience who we will call the 
other. The actor is the respondent in the study; the other is the one with 
whom the actor has the conversation. Information will be seen as symbolic 
material which the actor knows about an encounter and includes the actor's 
knowledge of himself, others in the situation, the setting, what is taking 
place, what has taken place in the past, and inferences about what will or 
may occur in the future. Honesty is defined as a "complete disclosure" of 
information, that is, verbally communicating to the other all of the 
situational ly relevant knowledge, "facts," or findings which the actor is 
cognizant.t> Complete disclosure is utilized as a benchmark to compare and 
contrast forms of information control. Information control is a verbal 
expression which restricts and/or distorts communication to the audience and 
is seen as an actor's saying something other than what he would have said if, 
in his judgment, he had been completely honest. 
Two forms of information control are utilized in this analysis: conceal-
ment and distortion. Concealment refers to relevant information kept from the 
other. In distortion, the actor gives information which misrepresents that 
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which he believes to be accurate or true. Typologies of the forms of information 
control are derived from the analysis of data. The "reasons" for information 
control are seen as accounts (Scott and Lyman, 1969:46-62) or motive vocabularies 
(Mills, 1940:904-913) mobilized to answer the question of why the actor did not 
give complete disclosure of relevant information in the situation. 
Finally, a caveat should be entered that in this study we see the moral 
concerns of honesty in social relationships in quite an amoral way. While 
morality is of critical significance in interaction, we see no absolutist 
umbrellas under which to huddle when assessing the criteria by which honesty is 
established. Our objective here is to treat the morality of the matter as a 
situationally emergent, and highly problematic concern of the participants in the 
relationships we are studying. 
Methodology 
The method of inquiry was to record the conversations in dyadic encounters. 
One-hundred and thirty respondents were asked to make a verbatim record of a 
conversation with a relative, intimate (boy/girl friend or best friend), friend, 
or acquaintance shortly after the encounter which was in some sense important 
to them, rather than just a casual "hello and how are you doing" conversation. 
These encounters were those in which important matters were at issue or at stake. 
Respondents documented the general elements of the encounter; description of 
the setting, nature of the relationship with the other, and definition of the 
situation. Past experiences and future expectations relevant to the interaction 
were also elicited. The sex of the respondent was noted. Finally, the remaining 
five pages of the interview instrument were used to record the verbatim conversa-
tion of the actor and other. 
After the narration of the actual conversation, each respondent was asked 
to review and evaluate each of his verbal expressions during the course of the 
encounter and to designate: 1) those statements which had been'completely 
honest," and 2) those statements which were not completely honest (i.e., state-
ments which were something other than what he "felt was a true or accurate 
representation of his feelings." Such a procedure attempts to identify the 
actor's conception of reality. This is, of course, only one element in an 
emerging definition of a situation. For each of the statements in which the 
respondent had not been honest, he was then asked to record "what he would 
have said vf he had been entirely honest." Finally, the respondent was 
questioned as to why he controlled information with the other; why there had 
been a discrepancy between what he said and what he would have said if he had 
been totally honest. (See Figure 1) 
After pretesting the interview schedules, standardized instructions were 
constructed to insure common understanding of terms such as honesty, lies, 
definition of the situation, etc. Analysis of these conversations suggested 
the extent of information control in social relationships and established 
typologies of forms of both information control and rationales for engaging in 
such behavior. 
Anaiysis and Results 
Data were analyzed and evaluated from the standpoing of the respondent; 
no information was collected which revealed whether the person to whom our 
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respondent was talking (the other) interpreted actor's conversation as honest 
or not. The focus is centered on the extent to which one member of the dyad, 
the actor, controlled information; what forms of information control he employed 
and his reasons or motives for doing so. We are assuming that the other is 
also engaging in information control for his own good reasons. We are relying 
on the actor's, our respondent's, recorded data in order to control the type 
and quality of data gathered. 
This analysis explores a new vantage point by dealing with encounters 
in which the actor is successful in his performance by manipulating information. 
Previously, Goffman6 has insightfully dealt with performances which are 
disrupted or "went to pieces." 
Our analysis indicates that information control is indeed prevalent, that 
it takes various forms, and that there are standard vocabularies of motive that 
actors use to justify such conduct. Nearly all of our respondents felt that 
honesty was not always the best policy. 
Incidence of Information Control 
The one-hundred and thirty respondents recorded a total of 870 statements 
or replies to others; of those 870 responses, 61.5 percent were verbal 
expressions which controlled information. 38.5 percent of the actor's 
conversational statements were classified as complete disclosure, "what I felt 
to be a completely honest statement." The 130 respondents recorded a mean of 
4.12 instances of information control with a range of one to fifteen; every 
respondent controlled information at least once in every encounter. On the 
other hand, the range of "honest" statements was zero to nine, with numerous 
respondents having no complete disclosures during the course of the conversa-
tion; the mean of honest disclosure was 2.58. 
130 Respondents 130 Encounters 
Honesty 
0-9 = Range of honest expressions 
2.58 = Mean of honest expressions 
335 (38.5%) complete disclosure 
535 (61.5%) information control 
870 = total verbal expressions 
in the 130 encounters 
Information Control 
1-15 = Range of controlled expressions 
4.12 = Mean of controlled expressions 
Our data show that six out of every ten verbal statements made by respondents 
showed some form of information control. Furthermore, analysis of conversations 
shows that the controlling of information predominates the discourse. Out of the 
130 encounters studied, there were no cases in which an actor was honest throughout 
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the entire conversation; however, there were numerous encounters that contained 
no honest conversation at all. Given the frequency of controlled verbal 
expressions, the next questions are how and why do people control information. 
Forms of Information Control 
From our analysis of conversations, a number of forms of information control 
were derived. Recognizing two general forms of information control, distortion 
and concealment, a more discriminating typology of forms was developed. 
Complete Disclosure 










This research collected (1) what the actor actually said during the conversa-
tion and (2) what he would have said if he had been one-hundred percent honest. 
If "B" represents the former and "C" the latter, the following are the forms 
of verbal information control (Also see Figure 1 ) : 
1. Lies, information in B and C are contradictory. 
2. Exaggerations: Type I, B contains C plus more information. 
3. Exaggerations: Type Ti, B contains more information than C in 
the sense that verbal modifiers in B are the superlatives 
to those in C. 
4. Half-Truths: Type I, B contains less information than C. 
5. Half-Truths: Type II, B contains less information than C in 
the sense that the modifiers in B are the subordinates 
of those in C. 
6. Secrets, B is absent of information, C is not. 
7. Diversionary Responses, B and C contain different information. 
Lies. Cases of information control were coded as lies when what actor said 
contradicted what he would have said if he had been totally honest. In this 
form of information control the same general theme is contained in both "B" and 
"C". 
B: You're really doing a nice job of sewing up the pants. 
C : Your sewing looks sloppy and messy. 
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The same central theme, "the sewing," is contained in both "B" and "C", but in 
"B" the actor tells the other that the sewing is a nice job; the actor actually 
felt the sewing was "sloppy and messy" (C). In the lie, "B" and "C" are contra-
dictory. 
Lies comprised thirty percent (30.7%) of the instances of information 
control recorded in our interviews (See Table 1). The lies told by the 
respondents ranged from "white lies" to exploitative prevarications; the 
majority of lies were seen by the actors as "white lie11 types designed not to 
exploit the other, but rather to "save face" and other reasons which will be 
discussed later. 
Our data show that the lie maximizes the amount of information controlled; 
that factor appears to be related to the frequent use of prevarication. Our 
respondents saw the lie as a very efficacious means of controlling information 
for whatever purposes they had in mind; it prevents communication of discourse 
which could embarrass, spoil presentation of self, insult the other, or be 
offensive in some way. In cases where there is actually little chance of being 
caught in the lie, and respondents viewed the consequences of complete disclosure 
as more negative than the risks of being discovered in falsehood. Given the 
consequences of giving an honest disclosure, controlling information via lies 
was an acceptable risk. But lies, if adroitly given, insulate the actor from 
being revealed by others as having prevaricated and maximize the control of 
information. 
Exaggerations: Types I and II. In these forms of information control the actor 
gives more information in his actual communication to the other than what he 
would have if he had been perfectly honest. The following example, in which 
an actor wanted to terminate the encounter, exemplifies the first type of 
exaggeration: 
B: Well, I still have to finish writing my paper, read 
two chapters, and study for an exam. 
C: I still need to read part of my book. 
In this instance, one sees that "B" and "C" contain some of the same informa-
tion (the need to read part of a book), but "B", the actual conversation, 
contains additional statements (finish a paper and study for an exam). The 
actor was overstating the number of tasks that needed attention in order to 
justify terminating the encounter. 
The second type of exaggeration differs from type one in that it is the 
modifiers that produce an overstatement; the modifiers in the actual discourse 
are superlatives to those in the wholly honest statement. 
B: The ski instructor took me down the advanced slope 
complete with moguls about thirty feet deep. 
C: The ski instructor took me down the intermediate slope 
complete with moguls. They were not thirty feet deep. 
In this case the same basic core of information, "skiing," is communicated, but 
the modifiers in "B" are superlatives of those in "C" (advanced versus inter-
mediate and thirty feet deep versus something less than thirty feet deep). 
Exaggerations, types I and II, accounted for only five percent (5%) of 
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the total cases of information control (See Table 1). Respondent conversations 
indicate that exaggerations are not as effective as other means of information 
control because the overstatement "calls attention to itself" and is more 
likely recognized by the other as a magnification of the truth. Respondents 
reported that an exaggeration is not accepted as credible by the other; the 
overstatement is not as deceptive as other forms. Thus when an actor per-
ceived a need to conceal or distort information, he typically chose another 
means to do so. It was not uncommon for others to interpret the exaggeration 
as humerous or "not really serious." In the very few cases in which our 
respondents utilized humor in controlling information, exaggerations were the 
forms they chose. 
Half-Truths: Types I and II. Half-truths comprised twenty-eight percent 
(28.9%) of the instances of information control; type I alone accounted for 
twenty-five percent (25,2%). In the first type of half-truth the actor's 
actual discourse contains only a part of what the actor considered complete 
disclosure or an absolutely honest statement: 
B: I'm going to do what my parents tell me to do until 
we're married. 
C: You've got a lot of guts to think I should do what you 
say. I'm not committed to you. I'm going to do what 
my parents tell me until we're married. 
In the type I half-truth, "C", what would have been a one-hundred percent 
honest answer, contains much more information than the actual statement (B) 
given to the other. The actor declined to tell the other that she was not 
as committed to him as he had assumed and that he was highly presumptuous; 
this half-truth partially conceals the truth, as defined by the actor. 
The half-truth, type II, is distinguished not so much by less data than 
the one-hundred percent honest statement, but rather is a partial distortion 
by virtue of modifiers which alter the tenor or emphasis of the statement. 
The following example exemplifies the second type of half-truth in which the 
modifiers in the actual conversation "play down" the truth or "give less than" 
an honest evaluation: 
B: Well, I'm not certain, but I think John may have been 
ripping off at least a couple of bucks a day. 
C: Well, I know for a fact that John has been stealing 
money from the station every day. 
The same basic information, "John is taking money," is included in both "B" 
and "C", but the modifiers in "B", "I'm not certain, but I think," are 
subordinate to the modifiers in "C", "I know for a fact." The modifiers 
provide a partial distortion of the truth. 
Half-truths are efficacious and effective means of controlling information 
or deception because they combine some truth and some falsehood. In several 
conversations in our study, a half-truth was a most credible technique of 
information control because it incorporated an element of truth, which the 
other also recognized, that legitimated the falsehood included within the 
discourse. The actor couches the falsehood in a reliable or credible bit of 
information and/or frame of reference. In conversations where the lie, rather 
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than the half-truth was used, this credible frame of reference or bit of truth 
was not readily available for use by the respondent. In summary, an 
efficacious half-truth is based on the premise that it takes some truth to 
make a good lie. 
As noted earlier, type I half-truths were much more common than type II. 
Our respondent data indicate that the type I maximizes information control 
more than the type II because it deceives by concealment rather than partial 
distortion by modifiers. In most conversations a half-truth which withholds 
certain data (type I) facilitates information control more than a half-truth 
which deceives by only modifying (type II) the central theme of the talk. 
Secrets. The secret is a form of information control in which the actor remains 
silent when he has something to say, i.e., when he has information which is 
relevant to the conversation; although some secrets may be protected by 
employing lies, exaggerations, and other forms of information control, cases 
were coded as secrets only when the actor remained silent when he had 
relevant information or feelings to the conversation. The coding procedure 
was chosen because it was most consistent with our respondents' interpretation 
of secrets—silence or complete concealment. Ploys such as diversionary 
responses, lies, half-truths in which the actor verbally responded rather 
than remaining silent were not defined by respondents as "keeping a secret"; 
however, to some degree, all information control could be seen as keeping a secret. 
In our respondents' records, a secret would be noted by the absence of 
communication in "B", but "C" would be a description of the secret information 
withheld. For example, in one encounter the other had asked our respondent 
why he had not received any comments on his latest work report from their boss. 
Actor remained silent. 
B: (silence) 
C: I was pretty certain that Mr. Hagerman (our boss) didn't 
like Jim's report. I didn't want to be the one to tell him. 
Our study of dyadic conversations revealed an infrequent use of secrets as 
information control techniques, only three percent (3.2%) of our cases. 
In conversations both actor and others are expected to take part in the 
talk, reciprocity is imposed. When a person speaks to another, he expects a 
response. An absence of that response is often seen as untoward behavior; 
silence places a strain on the conversation, as noted by one respondent, "I 
finally said something because the silence was so uncomfortable." Insofar as 
the secret is a form of information control in which the actor remains silent 
during some part of the encounter, it is disruptive to the interaction. Being 
disruptive to the conversation, secrets were used sparingly; most respondents 
chose some other form of control by which they could still conceal or distort 
information and continue the discourse. 
Diversionary Responses. The term "diversionary" does not imply that the 
response is inappropriate or not suited to the conversation; the way it does 
fit into the conversation is what makes it a pragmatic form of social control. 
In the diversionary response, what is communicated in the actor's actual dis-
course is different from or irrelevant to what the actor would have said had 
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he been one-hundred percent honest. Consider the following example in which a 
young lady does not want to be alone with a fellow who is an occasional date. 
He suggested that they leave the ballgame and retire to his dormitory room: 
B: No, it's too nice outside to go indoors. I just love 
this Colorado weather. 
C: I'm afraid to be alone with you right now. I know what 
you have in mind. 
The key element of the diversionary response is that "B" and "C" contain 
different information, not contradictory as in the lie. The actual conversa-
tion (B) is intended and used by the actor to divert the topic of conversation, 
being alone in the dormitory room, etc., to the niceties of the weather. 
Diversionary responses were the most frequently used forms of information 
control (32%); they maximize information control by completely concealing the 
actor's one-hundred percent honest evaluation. In addition, it deceives by 
distorting actor's true feelings by substituting a new topic of talk or 
"changing the subject." An adroit concealer using a diversionary form of 
information control can deceive another by "revealing" information seemingly 
valuable, but which is irrelevant to or different from his honest feelings. 
In essence, diversionary responses are efficacious means of information control 
because they divert the conversation from the information the actor desires to 
withhold. This tactic seals off certain information areas and opens up others 
which have less potential for undesirable disclosure. 
Respondents also saw the diversionary response as having certain other 
advantages over other forms of control. When one falsifies the "truth," he 
takes the risk of being caught in a lie or half-truth. The diversionary response 
simply detours or circumvents the undisclosed information without falsification 
or distortion; therefore the interactional risks of "discovery" are not as great. 
In a sense the diversionary response was less morally reprehensible, especially 
under conditions of discovery. 
Reasons for Information Control 
After researching the empirical frequency of information control in conversa-
tions and discovering the various forms of information control, the next 
question was why do people control information in encounters with others. 
At the conclusion of the conversations, respondents were asked why they said 
something other than a one-hundred percent honest response in the instances 
of information control. An analysis of these responses developed five reasons 
actors justified concealment and distortion of information.8 
1. Face, information control to protect actor's identity, the identity 
of the other, or identity of another person outside the encounter. 
2. Relationship, information control to maintain, maximize, or 
terminate the degree of intimacy and/or social distance with the other. 
3. Exploitation, information control to establish, maintain, or 
maximize power or influence over the other. 
4. Avoid tension/conflict, information control to preclude conflict 
or tension with the other. 
5. Situational control, information control to maintain, redirect, 
or terminate social interaction with the other. 
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Procedures and categories for coding the reasons actors gave for con-
trolling information were developed by extensive interivews with our respondents 
after completion of their conversation records. It is obvious that some 
categories such as face and relationship or avoidance of tension and 
situational control are not unrelated and exhibit some conceptual overlap; 
however, respondents conceptualized differences in reasons of face (protection 
of identity) and reasons of relationship (controlling social distance). 
Although similar in many respects, actors saw a difference between 
avoiding conflict with another and controlling the situational lines of action 
in an encounter in order to facilitate, redirect, or terminate the conversation. 
Face. Face has been defined as "the positive social value a person effectively 
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular 
contact" (Goffman, 1967:5). In other words, face refers to the positive 
feelings one has about his identity in a social situation. Analysis of 
reasons include three subtypes: (1) protection of the actor's face, (2) pro-
tection of the other's face, and (3) protection of another's face who is not 
a part of the dyadic encounter: 
Protection of actor's own face 
Jane has a rather perfect sex life and my ego didn't want her to 
know mine wasn't very good. 
I didn't want him to think that I sit there and just study and 
wait for his cai 1. 
I didn't want her to think I was dumb enough not to check the 
gas gauge. 
I shaded it with a few of the right words to make sure she knew 
it wasn't my fault. 
Protection of the other's face 
I didn't want to hurt his "big man" ego. 
I didn't want to offend her by referring to her tightness with 
money. 
The girl is fairly large and it would have hurt her a lot if I had 
told her my honest feelings about her new outfit. 
Protection of another's face 
I didn't give my honest feelings because I didn't want to offend 
his roommate. 
I just couldn't tell my boss that John had been taking money. 
If I had, John would have been fired and he would have been 
crushed. 
Not only was protecting of one's face frequently given as a reason for 
controlling information (27.7%), our respondents saw face as one of the most 
important and justifiable reasons (See Table 2). In relationships with others, 
one's identity and self-worth are of cardinal importance; controlling informa-
tion given to others about one's self is central to managing impressions 
(Goffman, 1959). By selectively communicating information about one's behavior, 
desires, feelings, etc., an individual endeavors to negotiate a positive 
validation of his announced identity. Analysis of conversations reveals that 
respondents' dialogues with others were designed to effect such consensual 
validation of self (Stone, 1962). 
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Not only must one negotiate a positive sense of self worth in his social 
encounters, he must also protect the other's self. Goffman has noted a 
mutual acceptance of interactants in face-to-face talk to maintain face of 
both actor and other: 
Just as the member of any group is expected to have self-
respect, so also he is expected to sustain a standard of 
considerateness; he is expected to go to certain lengths 
to save the feelings and the face of others present and he 
is expected to do this willingly and spontaneously because of 
of emotional identification with the others and with their 
feelings. In consequence, he is disinclined to witness the 
defacement of others (Goffman, 1967:10). 
Simmel insightfully understood the protection of an other's face: 
All of human intercourse rests on the fact that everybody 
knows somewhat more about the other than the other voluntarily 
reveals to him; and those things he knows are frequently 
matters whose knowledge the other person (were he aware of 
it) would find undesirable (Simmel, 1961:321). 
Twenty-five percent (25.6%) of the reasons given by respondents indicated 
that information control had been employed to prevent embarrassment, insult, 
or other negative implications of the other's self; respondents voiced 
altruistic motives in helping to protect the other's face. An actor is 
concerned with the face of the other because he has helped to create other's 
self image (Rose, 1969). The actor has invested a part of himself in the 
other, he has identified himself with the other (Goffman, 1967:10). Thus, he 
is not only protecting the other's self image, but reciprocally his own. 
Actor feels a sense of guardianship of the other's self; "in the social encounter 
the individual entrusts his 'face' to others and has a right to expect they 
will handle it gently" (Becker, 1971:88). In living up to this trust, actor 
controls information to affirm the other's face. 
In a few cases respondents reported that information control was utilized 
to protect the face of another person who was not present but was known by 
both actor and other (1.9%). Actor "didn't want to fink on another" or felt 
the other might be upset if the person under discussion were criticized. There 
were a few instances in which an actor controlled information to attack the 
other's or another's face: "I was trying to make him feel bad." One-hundred 
percent honest statements were more frequently used if an actor voiced this 
intent. 
The empirical data of this study reinforce and underline the work of 
Stone, Goffman, and others who stress the importance of self in human relation-
ships. 
Relationships. Not unrelated, but categorically different from reasons of 
face, are tne reasons given by respondents which justify information control 
to maintain or modify social relationships. In contrast to the face game in 
which actors cooperate and reciprocate to undergird self-esteem and allow no 
one to lose face, the relationship game involves an actor seeking to maximize 
[or minimize] the relationship beyond mere face (Lyman and Scott, 1970:44). 
Relationship refers to the amount of social distance or the degree of intimacy 
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between actor and other. An actor may control information in order to achieve 
a greater intimacy, lessen intimacy, or terminate a relationship (Lyman and 
Scott, 1970:43). 
Maintaining relationships 
A true response would have shut B.J. off just when I was getting 
to know him and wanting to know him better. 
I didn't feel like losing a friend that I've had for such a long 
time. So I said something other than the one-hundred 
percent truth. 
She is a sensitive person, so honesty certainly wouldn't help 
our friendship. 
In other such examples respondents reported that they were reluctant to respond 
to the other with a frank "no" to invitations or suggestions, but rather, 
couched their refusal or denial in a rhetoric of controlled information 
which softened or "toned down" the refusal. A regretted inability to comply 
with the other's requests or invitations served to maintain the relationship. 
Terminating the relationship 
I didn't like him much so I thought if I told him that I was 
engaged, he wouldn't bother me so much and keep calling. 
By telling her what I did, it would make it easier to break up 
with her. It wasn't the truth, but it served the purpose 
of breaking up with her without any big hassle. 
Approximately 10 percent (9.6%) of the reasons given were accounts to 
justify the manipulation of talk so as to facilitate or terminate relationships. 
Respondents recognized the fact that encounters cannot be terminated abruptly, 
but rather with subtlety, thoughtfulness, and grace. Information control, 
fabricating a justifiable reason for taking leave, was one of the ways whereby 
one "eased" his way out of the conversation. The typical social situation 
which information control was used to manipulate relationships were encounters 
of courtship and friendship. 
"Relation building constitutes mutual and deepening reciprocal escalation 
of trust and commitment" (Lyman and Scott, 1970:45). Simmel insightfully 
pointed out that in the development of relationships that secrets and undisclosed 
information are basic ingredients of intimacy. Not only is the disclosure 
of these secrets to others outside the dyad an irreparable breach of the 
relationship, but also the discussion of many of these secrets is prohibited 
between the two (Simmel, 1950:307-378). The two individuals in the relationship 
selectively steer around the touch topics in their own conversations; thus 
information control is an element in the development and maintenance of mutual 
and reciprocal trust. 
Exploitation. Exploitation, as a motive for controlling information, refers 
to the actor's attempt to gain power and control over other, that is, to 
manipulate other's actions in accordance with actor's own desires. The 
following statements are illustrative: 
I was flattering her so that I could pick her up. 
I said what I said to make him get on his knees and beg me to 
stay. 
I didn't really like the kid at all, but his money was nice to 
pay for gas. 
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I was "playing" with her in order to manipulate her response. 
By use of selectively chosen discourse the actor endeavored to establish a 
frame of meaning in the encounter which will be conducive to the procurement 
of his wishes and desires. The actor controls information in order to create 
a definition of the situation which facilitates the attainment of his goals. 
Only a few of the reasons given by respondents were classified as 
exploitative (1.7%). There was some evidence that respondents, even under 
intensive interview, were unwilling to admit they had been exploitative of 
others. Analysis of conversations show that exploitation is implied in many 
of the instances in which face, relationship, and other reasons were given. 
In several instances respondents reported that they concealed informa-
tion to preclude the possibility of the other divulging that information 
to others; actors were concerned that they might be exploited by "blackmail." 
In these cases information control was employed to protect themselves from 
exploitation. 
Avoidance of tension and conflict. Respondents often cited the use of 
information control to avoid conflict or tension with the other, twenty-two 
percent (22.2%) of the reasons. In these instances the actor was concerned 
with manipulating his conversations to avoid topics which might trigger 
arguments or tensions in the encounter: 
Because if I said what I thought was one-hundred percent honest, 
it would have been a bad scene. 
There are less hassles if I blame my parents rather than 
myself. 
If I had given an honest statement, Bob would have started 
another argument. 
In some situations where an actor insists on his own definition of the 
situation, the continuation of the encounter may be threatened by open 
conflict or tension; in these instances the actor verbally negotiates around 
these "touchy" subjects. Respondents felt most interactions with others 
have a disruptive or conflicting potential and that controlling information 
was an effective means of preventing such from occurring. 
Situation Control. Actors noted three other reasons which deal explicitly with 
the flow of interaction in an encounter. These reasons did not deal directly 
with the relationship with the other, but rather with the maintenance of the 
encounter, to keep it going (4.5%). Another reason was to redirect the 
conversation to move the dialogue to another topic (2.2%). The final type 
of reason was to terminate the encounter (3.2%). These reasons totaled 
approximately ten percent of the justifications for information control. 
Facilitate the encounter 
She was really interested in education so I expressed a so-called 
interest to keep the conversation going. I really wasn't 
interested, but I didn't want to disrupt the conversation with her. 
I didn't want to stop him from explaining by saying something that 
was contradictory. I agreed with him so he could continue. 
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Redirect encounter 
I said something other than an honest answer in order to get Tom 
to stop worrying about the paper so we could talk about 
something else. 
I didn't want to talk, about something I felt inferior about so 
I simply ignored him and changed the subject. 
Terminate the encounter 
I felt uncomfortable and wanted her to leave me alone. So I told 
her that I had to study in order to end our discussion. 
The easiest way to get her to stop talking and leave is to agree 
with her. I really didn't believe what I said to her. 
Manipulating the flow of interaction in the encounter has implication for 
face, relationships, exploitation, etc., however, in these cases the 
respondent was more concerned with the interaction itself, the emerging 
definition of the situation. 
Conclusion 
The modest beginning that this research had made into the interactional 
dilemmas of honesty warrants equally modest conclusions. The most obvious 
and compelling implication of this study is that our own definition of honesty 
as "complete disclosure" of all relevant information may be quite inaccurate 
when placed in the kinds of social situations we have explored. For rather 
than using this commonsense and rather folklorish definition, our respondents 
instead seemed to see honesty more as fidelity to the maintenance of some 
on-going relationship, and consequently maneuvered information in such a 
way as not to jeopardize that relationship. Seen in this way, selectively 
controlling information, rather than being regarded as deceptive, hypo-
critical, morally wrong, or ethically questionable, was interpreted by our 
respondents as the right thing to do in order to prevent the agonizing 
experiences of embarrassment, disruption, and the severing of relationships 
which often had been built up laboriously over a period of time. 
That is not to say, of course, that our respondents did not know the 
difference between what could be construed as an "honest" response and 
what they in fact said; they did know and our entire analysis was based on 
their knowledge of various disparities between the two. On the other hand, 
most of our respondents did not confuse honesty with either sincerity or 
frankness; misconceptions that are frequently found in the literature on 
honesty (Kaufmann:1973). While sincerity may be preferable to insincerity, 
it is not honesty, as our respondents seemed to know, for they engated in 
the telling of all sorts of falsehoods with charming conviction. In fact, we 
may say that in American society such confusion is rampant because sincerity 
is an appearance that we can easily put on and be put on by (as Goffman has 
so eloquently shown), whereas honesty is presumably buried in people's minds 
and not open to easy inspection. The frequent use of such terms as "sincerely," 
"really," "on-the-level," and "I'm not putting you on," suggests that if we 
are to be deceived, we want to have a good job done of it whether we are 
presenting the deception or are the recipient of it. 
Our respondents also seemed to know the difference between honesty 
and frankness. If honesty is frankness, it becomes an extremely easy virtue 
to attain, for it turns extreme rudeness into moral superiority. It is clear, 
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however, that many of the forms of information control we have analyzed here 
were engaged in to avoid the kind of frankness that might be taken for 
honesty and bring the relationship tumbling down. Our respondents stressed 
over and again that relationships are most important than truth, and that 
the relationships are, after all, what social life is all about. Truth and 
honesty are somewhat abstract notions, especially as they are expressed in 
conventional American ideology. In order to make them useful they have to 
be braided into the give-and-take of everyday situations. Is it honest to 
tell someone a truth that would sever or greatly jeopardize your relationship 
with a person if that is honestly not what you want to do? The answer seems 
clear and may tell us that it is easier to tell someone the bald truth after 
we have decided that we don't care what happens to our relationship with 
them anyway. In other words, being truthful and honest at all times may have 
consequences which are neither truthful nor honest, and that seems best to 
describe our respondent's dilemma, and their adroitness in managing it. 
What accounts for this concern about relationships? It has been said 
that life in mass society has become increasingly impersonal, that we now 
live in what is essentially a world of strangers (Lofland:1973). All of this 
may be true but does not in itself link such structural conditions with the 
interactional situations we have analyzed in this paper. What accomplishes 
the linkage is the action of people such as our respondents who are anxious 
that their relationships, put together with some care, are not torn apart by 
what they see as a foolish and devastating fidelity to the ideological demand 
that people be honest all the time. This may simply be more evidence for 
the notion that abstract ideologies are losing their power to influence people's 
behavior (Be71:1960). But more to the point seems to be the idea that 
emerged from our data that since our culture is a tissue of lies and contra-
dictions, and since social meanings are human constructs anyway, the best one 
can do is to engage in one polite fiction after another, thereby keeping 
relationships and meanings alive in a world that may be rapidly losing both. 
It is with naivete of social interaction that many observers of social 
behavior make proclamations clothed in ethical and religious rhetoric that 
many social problems would be solved if in all social relationships people 
were one-hundred percent honest. It is obvious that Cervantes was ridiculing 
Quixote who believed in such an empty platitude and a society which employs 
such ideological mystification to cloak its deception -- because honesty is 
not always the best policy. 
Footnotes 
1. Revised version of a paper presented to The Midwest Sociological Associa-
tion, Omaha, Nebraska, 1973. 
2. See Thomas A, Harris, I'm O.K., You're O.K. (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). 
3. Information control has been a point of concern in macro- as well as micro-
sociology. General systems or cybernetic models stress the importance of 
free-flow of information (Blau and Scott, 1962:116-139; Wilensky, 1967) for 
problem solving, decision-making, and creative thinking. Although information 
control is generally regarded as undesirable by such points of view, sociologists 
have sometimes argued that inter-organizational information control is beneficial 
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and necessary. Information screens which are intended to preclude a free flow 
of information and protect an organization from its social environment, 
insulate a system or organization from undesired outside evaluation, and 
allow a presentation of a unified front to others are seen as functional, 
and such control is a source of organizational power. 
4. This focus on verbal interaction is one of the major weaknesses of this 
investigation. The selective presentation of information by an actor to his 
audience is an extremely complex process involving, obviously, not only verbal 
communication (in Goffman's terms expressions given) but also a host of non-
verbal expressions given off. Furthermore expressions given off are not only 
vocabularies of communication in their own right, but may also qualify the 
meaning of verbal expressions given. This complex matrix of meaningful action 
is considerably simplified by our focus on only verbal programs and can be 
justified only by the extremely tentative and exploratory goals of this study. 
5. This is but one of many definitions of honesty that are currently in use. 
We have selected this definition over others for it seems to us to be the 
definition most likely to emerge in relationships and interactions themselves. 
Interpersonally it is our contention that people tend to define virtually any 
sort of information control as less than honest. While we disagree with this 
definition, it is nonetheless the one most likely to be encountered in social 
relationships. For an extremely sophisticated discussion of honesty from 
the standpoint of existential philosophy, see Walter Kaufman, Without Guilt 
and Justice: From Decidiophobia to Autonomy. 
6. Another interesting approach to this research would be to study the extent 
to which the other is or is not aware that actor is controlling information. 
Goffman has pointed out that an actor's performance may be sincere or cynical 
while the other can interpret the performance as either sincere or cynical. 
If the other deems the performance as insincere, the performance is discredited 
regardless of the cynicism or sincerity of the actor (Goffman, 1959). 
7. Other analyses of data showed no significant differences between informa-
tion control frequencies for males or females; nor were specific forms of 
or reasons for information control significantly related to gender. However, 
we did note that information control is more prevalent in secondary than in 
primary relationships. Because of familiarity and a high frequency of inter-
action, there seems to be some evidence that a greater possibility of detection 
exists in primary relationships; therefore, actors are more careful in these 
encounters and use information control more sparingly. These data are under 
further research and are forthcoming. 
8. Lyman and Scott's typology of game frameworks proved useful in analyzing 
our conversational data. In some ways this research is an empirical check 
of their ideas. See Lyman and Scott, 1970:29-69. 
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Table 1 
Frequencies of the Forms of Information Control 
Form Raw Numbers Percentages 
Lie 164 30.7 
Exaggeration 
(Type I) 12 2.2 
Exaggeration 
(Type II) 15 2.8 
Half-Truth 
(Type I) 135 25.2 
Half-Truth 
CType 113 20 3.7 
Secret 17 3 ,2 
Diversionary 
Response 172 32.1 
Total Cases of 
Information Control 535 99.9 
Information Control in Conversations 89 
Table 2 
Frequencies of the Reasons for Information Control 
Reason Raw Numbers Percentages 
Protect own face 148 2 7 . 7 
Protect other's face 137 2 5 . 6 ) 5 5 . 2 
Protect another's face 10 1 . 9 
Attack other's face 7 
Attack another's face 1 
1 . 3 ? 
. 2 J 
Maintain relationship 36 6 
Terminate relationship 15 2 •8 J 9 ' ' 
Exploitation 9 1 . 7 
Avoid tension/conflict 119 22 . 2 
Maintain interaction 24 4 . 5 
Redirect interaction 12 2 . 2 
1 
9 .9 
Terminate interaction 17 3 . 2 J 
Totals 535 1 0 0 , 1 
